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Chapter 15 · Part VNew in edition 1.1

15. Drivers to 2050: what is near-certain, what is not

Some forces acting on Vietnam's protein supply to 2050 are close to certain: an ageing workforce, fewer smallholder livestock farms, endemic pig disease, tight agricultural emission caps, a sinking and saltier Mekong Delta, and continued dependence on imported soy and maize. Others are open. Two external uncertainties matter most for alternative protein: whether feed-protein imports come under chronic stress, and whether Asia's fermentation industry stays an open market or falls under Chinese price dominance. They become the axes of the 2050 scenarios in chapter 18.

14 min readWhat the tags mean
On this page
  1. 15.1 Near-certain trends
  2. 15.2 Critical uncertainties
  3. 15.3 Shocks already on the record, and wildcards
  4. 15.4 How the drivers reach protein supply
  5. 15.5 What this means

In one paragraph. Part V looks past the 2035 horizon of chapter 13. We start with the forces that will shape Vietnam's protein supply whatever anyone decides. Some are close to certain because the people, rules or physics are already in place: the working-age population peaks between 2035 and 2040; smallholder pig farms keep disappearing; African swine fever stays endemic; agriculture must cut its emissions to 56 MtCO2e by 2050; the Mekong Delta keeps sinking faster than the sea rises; and Vietnam keeps importing most of its soy and maize. Others are open. Of these, two external questions decide most for alternative protein: whether imported feed protein comes under chronic stress (fishmeal collapses, simultaneous crop failures in exporting countries, blocked shipping) or stays cheap and ample, as the published baseline to 2035 expects; and whether Asia's fermentation industry becomes an open regional market or one where Chinese scale sets every price. These two questions are the axes of the 2050 scenarios in Scenarios 2050.

These forces are already in motion. Policy can speed them up or soften them, but not reverse them before 2050.

DriverWhat we expectHorizonChannel to protein supplySources
AgeingWorking-age population peaks at about 72 million around 2035 to 2040; people aged 65 and over rise from 9.5% (2025) to 20.0% (2050) of the population 2035 to 2050Fewer farm workers; automation favours integrators and factories1
Farm labour and smallholder exit16.5 million rural farm, forestry and fishery workers in 2025, down 2.84 million since 2016; about 13.8 million (2035) and 10.6 million (2050) if the 2016 to 2025 decline of 1.75% a year continues 2035, 2050Feed use moves to compound feed; feedstock collection needs contracts, not casual labour2
Industrial livestockSmall household farms supply 35 to 40% of pork, a share falling 5 to 7% a year; every disease shock has shifted output to integrators 2030sMore compound feed and more buyers able to specify novel ingredients3,4,5
Endemic pig disease952 to 3,029 African swine fever outbreaks a year in 2020 to 2024, after the 2019 epidemic; recombinant strains that current vaccines do not fully cover rose from 14.1% to 42.2% of sampled outbreaks in 2023 to 2024 to the 2030sRecurring swings in feed demand; stronger case for biosecure, closed supply chains4,6,7,8
No preventive antibioticsProphylactic antibiotics banned in livestock from 1 January 2026 2026 onwardsNear-term market for fermentation-made additives: probiotics, yeast products, enzymes9,10
Agricultural emission capsAgriculture capped at 64 MtCO2e in 2030 and 56 MtCO2e in 2050, against a 2020 base of 104.5 MtCO2e (the NDC's business-as-usual level) (official target)2030, 2050Pressure on livestock methane and manure; alternative protein is not among the official levers11,12,13
A sinking, saltier deltaGroundwater pumping lowers the delta about 1.1 cm a year, about three times the current rate of global sea-level rise; subsidence and riverbed incision could enlarge the salinity-affected area by 10 to 27% by about 2050 2050Coastal land moves from rice to shrimp: more aquafeed protein, fewer rice by-products14,15,16,17,18
Humid heatThe delta gains up to 60 extra days a year above a wet-bulb globe temperature of 32 °C before 2040 2040Closed, cooled animal houses; higher power demand; heat-tolerant process design19,20
Shrinking capture fisheriesCapture to fall from about 3.8 Mt (2025) to 2.8 Mt (2030); the trawl fleet that lands trash fish to shrink by about 59% against 2016 (official target)2030More formulated aquafeed, especially for marine fish and lobster21,22,23
Import dependenceSoybean-meal need rises from 7.2 Mt (2025) to about 10.4 Mt (2050) on trend diets and efficiency, nearly all imported 2050The core supply question of this study (Protein balance 2050)24,25
Energy transition on paperNon-hydro renewables planned at 74 to 75% of power by 2050, with 240 GW of offshore wind reserved for hydrogen and ammonia; gas and LNG remain to 2050 (official target)2050Clean power becomes possible for fermentation; delivery lags plans (Frontier technology)26,27,28,29
about 72 million, around 2035 to 2040
Peak working-age population
2024 (UN WPP)
Context and sources

People aged 65 and over rise from 9.5% (2025) to 20.0% (2050) of the population; the old-age dependency ratio rises from 14 to 32 per 100. UN World Population Prospects 2024, medium variant. 1

56 MtCO2e
Agricultural emissions cap, 2050
2022 (Decision 896)
Context and sources

Official cap: 64 MtCO2e in 2030 and 56 MtCO2e in 2050, against a 2020 base of 104.5 MtCO2e, the NDC business-as-usual level (46% lower). Official livestock levers are feed rations, manure and biogas, not alternative protein. 11,12,13

about 1.1 cm a year
Mekong Delta subsidence from groundwater pumping
about 2015 (2017 study)
Context and sources

About three times the current rate of global sea-level rise (IPCC AR6: 3.7 mm a year, 2006 to 2018); the delta sits on average about 0.8 m above sea level. Subsidence to 2100 ranges from 12 to 100 cm depending on extraction policy. 14,15,30,18

Two readings.

  • Demography and disease push towards industrial feed, which helps new ingredients. A novel protein is sold to feed mills and integrators, not to 8 million farm households. Every step towards fewer, larger buyers makes it easier to prove, specify and sell a new ingredient .
  • The climate case for alternative protein in Vietnam rests on imported feed, manure and land, not on national methane totals. Rice holds two-thirds of the agricultural methane cap (30.7 of 45.9 MtCO2e in 2030) 31 . This confirms edition 1.0 (Economics).

15.2 Critical uncertainties

These drivers matter a great deal and could go either way by 2050. We found no basis for assigning probabilities to most of them.

UncertaintyOne endOther endWhat we know nowSources
Feed-protein import stressBenign: ample soy and maize, fishmeal recoversChronic: repeated fishmeal collapses, joint crop failures in exporting countries, shipping disruptionThe published baseline to 2035 is ample supply: China's soybean imports fall 12% and Argentina's protein-meal exports rise 17% (OECD-FAO baseline). But the 2026 Peruvian anchoveta season landed only about 25% of a quota that was already the lowest in a decade , and NOAA gives over 90% odds of a very strong El Niño in winter 2026 to 2027 (published probability)32,33,34,35,36
Asia's fermentation marketOpen: several countries build capacity, trade freely and share approvalsChinese price dominance: Chinese scale and costs set every regional priceA plant that costs USD 100 million to build in the US costs about USD 15 million in China; Angel Yeast opened an 11,000 t a year yeast-protein plant in 2025 . Every regional peer (China, Japan, Korea, India, Thailand, Singapore) now funds a bio-manufacturing instrument with a 2030 to 2035 horizon 37,38,39,40,41
Trade politicsStable rulesTariffs and purchase deals set sourcingUS tariff policy on Vietnam changed four times in 16 months (2025 to 2026), with three different rates applied; Vietnamese firms signed memorandums to buy over USD 2.9 billion of US farm goods 42,43,44,45,46
Growth pathAbout 5% a year10% a year to 2030, then 7.5% (official)Official aim: GDP per person about USD 38,000 by 2050 (current prices) (official target). On slower paths, real GDP per person in 2035 is about USD 7,400 to 8,300 47,48,26,49,50
Clean-power deliveryPlans met; firm renewable power cheapLNG and coal stay longThe first green hydrogen plant had only perimeter works in May 2026, three years after ground-breaking 51,52,29
Carbon pricing reachStays on power, steel and cementReaches feed, livestock or export supply chainsThe domestic pilot covers 110 plants and excludes agriculture; the World Bank recommends USD 29 per tCO2e (2030) and USD 90 (2040) for Vietnam ; Denmark will tax livestock emissions from 2030 53,54,55,56
DiseaseA fully protective ASF vaccineVaccine escape; mammal-adapted H5N1Three live ASF vaccines licensed but not covering recombinant strains, a risk to 2035 ; H5N1 in Vietnamese zoo tigers in 2024 carried mammalian-adaptation mutations57,58,59
Political framingSecurity and industryBacklash or indifferenceSecurity framing displaced climate framing in the EU, Japan and Korea in 2024 to 2026 ; seven US states ban or pause cultivated meat; Singapore dropped "30 by 30" in November 202560,61,62,63,64

Drivers to 2050: impact and uncertainty

Our judgement scores (1 low to 5 high) for impact on Vietnam's alternative-protein supply and for uncertainty to 2050

Drivers to 2050: impact and uncertaintyScatter of 17 drivers by uncertainty and impact. Near-certain trends such as ageing, smallholder exit and import dependence sit at low uncertainty; feed-protein import stress and the structure of Asia's fermentation market sit at the top right, with the highest impact and uncertainty, and form the scenario axes.Near-certain trendCritical uncertaintyscenario axes1122334455Uncertainty to 2050 (1 low to 5 high)Impact (1 low to 5 high)1. Ageing; working-age peak 2035 to 2040: impact 2, uncertainty 1 Class: near-certain trend Channel: Buyers; labour Horizon: 2035 to 2050 Sources: GEO-3114. Antibiotic ban in livestock: impact 2, uncertainty 1 Class: near-certain trend Channel: Buyers (additives) Horizon: 2026 onwards Sources: GEO-2447. Humid heat: impact 2, uncertainty 1 Class: near-certain trend Channel: Cost; siting Horizon: 2,040 Sources: CLM-1672. Smallholder exit and industrial livestock: impact 3, uncertainty 1 Class: near-certain trend Channel: Buyers Horizon: 2030s Sources: GEO-15; GEO-36; GEO-4723. Endemic African swine fever: impact 3, uncertainty 2 Class: near-certain trend Channel: Buyers; demand swings Horizon: to the 2030s Sources: GEO-15; GEO-1736. Delta subsidence and salinity: impact 3, uncertainty 2 Class: near-certain trend Channel: Buyers; feedstock; siting Horizon: 2,050 Sources: CLM-13; CLM-1568. Shrinking capture fisheries: impact 3, uncertainty 2 Class: near-certain trend Channel: Buyers (aquafeed) Horizon: 2,030 Sources: NTS-08; AQF-1585. Agricultural emission caps: impact 2, uncertainty 2 Class: near-certain trend Channel: Carbon Horizon: 2030, 2050 Sources: CLM-0159. Import dependence for soy and maize: impact 4, uncertainty 1 Class: near-certain trend Channel: Imported protein Horizon: 2,050 Sources: MAC-04; QNT-01910. Feed-protein import stress (axis 1): impact 5, uncertainty 5 Class: critical uncertainty Channel: Imported protein Horizon: 2030 to 2050 Sources: GEO-37; HSC-28; CLM-241011. Asia's fermentation market (axis 2): impact 5, uncertainty 4 Class: critical uncertainty Channel: Cost; buyers Horizon: 2030 to 2050 Sources: HSC-13; ECF-291112. Clean-power delivery: impact 4, uncertainty 4 Class: critical uncertainty Channel: Cost; carbon Horizon: 2035 to 2050 Sources: FTG-27; GEO-261213. Trade politics: impact 3, uncertainty 4 Class: critical uncertainty Channel: Imported protein Horizon: 2026 to 2035 Sources: GEO-04; GEO-061315. Carbon pricing reach: impact 3, uncertainty 4 Class: critical uncertainty Channel: Carbon Horizon: 2030 to 2050 Sources: ECF-12; CLM-181516. Disease (ASF vaccines, H5N1): impact 3, uncertainty 4 Class: critical uncertainty Channel: Buyers; demand swings Horizon: 2026 to 2035 Sources: HSC-31; GEO-431614. Growth path: impact 3, uncertainty 3 Class: critical uncertainty Channel: Demand Horizon: 2035 to 2050 Sources: NTS-14; GEO-331417. Political framing and acceptance: impact 3, uncertainty 3 Class: critical uncertainty Channel: Rules; money Horizon: 2026 to 2035 Sources: VIS-15; HSC-35171Ageing; working-age peak 2035 to 20402Smallholder exit and industrial livestock3Endemic African swine fever4Antibiotic ban in livestock5Agricultural emission caps6Delta subsidence and salinity7Humid heat8Shrinking capture fisheries9Import dependence for soy and maize10Feed-protein import stress (axis 1)11Asia's fermentation market (axis 2)12Clean-power delivery13Trade politics14Growth path15Carbon pricing reach16Disease (ASF vaccines, H5N1)17Political framing and acceptance

Scores are AltProtein Vietnam judgement from the evidence in chapter 15, not measurements.

Sources: 1,32,38,11,65,51

Show dataHide data
Drivers to 2050: impact and uncertainty
NumberDriverClassImpact (1 to 5)Uncertainty (1 to 5)ChannelHorizon
1Ageing; working-age peak 2035 to 2040near-certain trend21Buyers; labour2035 to 2050
2Smallholder exit and industrial livestocknear-certain trend31Buyers2030s
3Endemic African swine fevernear-certain trend32Buyers; demand swingsto the 2030s
4Antibiotic ban in livestocknear-certain trend21Buyers (additives)2026 onwards
5Agricultural emission capsnear-certain trend22Carbon2030, 2050
6Delta subsidence and salinitynear-certain trend32Buyers; feedstock; siting2050
7Humid heatnear-certain trend21Cost; siting2040
8Shrinking capture fisheriesnear-certain trend32Buyers (aquafeed)2030
9Import dependence for soy and maizenear-certain trend41Imported protein2050
10Feed-protein import stress (axis 1)critical uncertainty55Imported protein2030 to 2050
11Asia's fermentation market (axis 2)critical uncertainty54Cost; buyers2030 to 2050
12Clean-power deliverycritical uncertainty44Cost; carbon2035 to 2050
13Trade politicscritical uncertainty34Imported protein2026 to 2035
14Growth pathcritical uncertainty33Demand2035 to 2050
15Carbon pricing reachcritical uncertainty34Carbon2030 to 2050
16Disease (ASF vaccines, H5N1)critical uncertainty34Buyers; demand swings2026 to 2035
17Political framing and acceptancecritical uncertainty33Rules; money2026 to 2035

Why two axes, and why these two

Scenario practice needs two uncertainties that are high in impact, not controlled by the reader, and largely independent of each other 66,67 .

  • Import stress decides whether domestic protein is worth its cost premium. On today's prices, microbial feed protein made in Vietnam costs several times soybean-meal protein (Economics); only a sustained fishmeal shortage or a security premium changes that.
  • The structure of Asia's fermentation market decides whether a Vietnamese plant can sell at all, and to whom. Chinese capital costs and capacity set the landed price that any Vietnamese product must beat.
  • The two are largely independent. Anchoveta, maize yields in the Americas and shipping lanes do not depend on Chinese industrial policy, and the reverse.

Vietnam's own choices (the food law, feed lists, public money, a protein statistic) are deliberately not axes. They are the moves we test against the scenarios in Robust moves. Growth, trade politics, carbon pricing and disease enter as sensitivities within each scenario and as wildcards.

15.3 Shocks already on the record, and wildcards

Vietnam's protein supply has already absorbed large shocks: ASF killed or forced the culling of nearly 6 million pigs in 2019, over a fifth of the herd 3,4 ; the 2026 Middle East conflict raised world urea prices 54% in one month and Vietnamese feed prices 10 to 14% 68,69,70 . The shock register (shock_register.csv, 17 events) and 26 wildcards (wildcards.csv) are in X. Drivers and signals.

7% a year at 2 °C; 86% at 4 °C
Chance of a joint maize failure in the four largest exporters
published model
Context and sources

Probability that all four largest maize exporters (87% of world exports) lose more than 10% in the same year: near zero today, 7% at 2 °C of warming (around the 2040s), 86% at 4 °C. Vietnam imports about three-quarters of its maize. 65

15.4 How the drivers reach protein supply

Five channels carry these drivers into the economics of alternative protein. Each chapter that follows picks up one or more.

ChannelDrivers acting on itDirection for domestic alternative protein by 2050Where it is analysed
Price and availability of imported proteinImport stress; trade politics; climate in exporting countries; El NiñoStronger if stress becomes chronic; weak if the 2035 baseline of ample supply holdsProtein balance 2050, Scenarios 2050
Cost of making protein in VietnamClean-power delivery; hydrogen; capital cost; learning rates; Chinese scaleFalls, but slower than solar did; soybean-meal parity stays out of reach on current evidenceFrontier technology
Carbon and feedstockEmission caps; carbon pricing; rice-straw rules; cassava demand from ethanol and ChinaResidue carbon and clean power become preconditions for any climate claimFrontier technology, Z. Aquafeed and feedstocks 2050
BuyersIndustrial livestock; aquafeed growth; trash-fish replacement; antibiotic banMore, larger buyers able to specify novel ingredients; aquafeed and additives firstProtein balance 2050, Z. Aquafeed and feedstocks 2050
Rules, money and placeFood law; feed lists; biotech strategy; hub siting; political framingDecided mostly by Vietnam; the robust movesVision 2050, Robust moves, Y. Targets and hubs

15.5 What this means

  • Investors: demography and disease are consolidating the buyer base. The two uncertainties to price are import stress and Chinese costs; everything else is second-order before 2035.
  • Policy makers: the near-certain trends all point to more imported protein and more compound feed. None of Vietnam's 2050 plans (power, hydrogen, climate caps) has a protein or feed number to go with it (Y. Targets and hubs).
  • Startups: the first markets created by these trends are functional feed additives (antibiotic ban), aquafeed for marine fish (trash-fish replacement) and residue-based carbon (straw rules).
  • Manufacturers: plan for recurring shocks rather than a trend. Multi-supplier protein strategies and formulation flexibility are the proven defences.
  • Research and international bodies: Vietnam has no published protein or feed balance and no official number beyond 2030 for meat, feed or aquaculture. A shared baseline is the most useful public good (Robust moves).

Related: Outlook (scenarios to 2035), X. Drivers and signals (full driver, shock, signal and wildcard registers), U. Futures method.

Sources cited on this page

All sources (Appendix T)

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